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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 
Tonin Pllumi (“Pllumi”)1 is a native and citizen of 
Albania who entered the United States illegally and has been 
found removable pursuant to § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the 
                                              
1
 Throughout the Administrative Record (“AR”), 
Mr. Pllumi is referred to as having the last name “Pllumaj.”  
See, e.g.  AR at 111.  However, the IJ and BIA decisions, as 
well as his own brief, use the last name “Pllumi.”   We will 
therefore refer to the petitioner as Pllumi. 
3 
 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  Pllumi has filed a petition for review 
based on the denial by the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA”) of his motion asking the BIA to reopen his 
immigration proceedings and reconsider its decision declining 
to grant him asylum.  The BIA denied his motion as untimely 
and chose not to exercise its authority to reopen the case sua 
sponte.  Pllumi claims that the decision not to reopen requires 
remand because the BIA abused its discretion in determining 
that he had failed to demonstrate changed country conditions, 
and because the BIA predicated its refusal to reopen on the 
erroneous belief that healthcare concerns cannot be a basis for 
asylum.  Although we conclude that the first of those 
arguments is meritless, there may be merit in the second.  
Because the basis upon which the BIA declined to exercise its 
authority to reopen sua sponte is unclear, we will grant the 
petition for review and remand so that the BIA can clarify its 




Pllumi filed his original application for asylum and 
withholding of removal on June 19, 2002.  In 2005, he 
supplemented that application and added a claim under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  In support of his 
application, Pllumi asserted that he had suffered persecution 
because of his active support of Albania’s Democratic Party 
and because he is Catholic.  Further, Pllumi alleged that he 
feared he would again be persecuted for his political and 
religious beliefs if he were returned to Albania.  Ultimately, 
the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied him all relief, holding 
4 
 
that Pllumi had failed to establish past persecution or a well-




Pllumi appealed that decision and, on June 28, 2007, 
the BIA upheld the IJ’s decision, concluding that, even if 
Pllumi were credible, he had not established a well-founded 
fear of persecution and thus had failed to establish his 
eligibility for relief.  In its decision, the BIA also determined 
that Pllumi was ineligible for humanitarian asylum under 
either subsection (A) or (B) of 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii) 
because, first, any persecution he had suffered in the past was 
not so severe as to constitute a “compelling reason” under 
subsection (A) for Pllumi to be unwilling or unable to return 
to his home country and, second, he had failed to establish 
that, as required by subsection (B), he would be subject to 
“other serious harm” upon removal.  Because Pllumi had not 
established asylum eligibility, it followed that he had “also 
failed to satisfy the higher burden of proof required for 
withholding of removal.”  (AR at 127.)  Additionally, the BIA 
held that Pllumi did not qualify for CAT protection because 
                                              
2
 More particularly, the IJ found that Pllumi was not 
credible and thus, through testimony alone, was unable to lay 
the required foundation to establish past persecution. In 
addition, the IJ said that the persecution Pllumi allegedly 
suffered was no different than conditions suffered by all non-
elite Albanians during the time in question and thus could not 
sustain a grant of asylum.  The IJ also held that, even 
assuming that Pllumi’s allegations established past 
persecution, changed country conditions  –  namely the 
Democratic Party’s rise to power – rebutted any presumption 
of future persecution.   
5 
 
he had failed to establish that it was more likely than not he 
would be tortured upon return to Albania.   
 
On September 17, 2009, Pllumi filed the motion that is 
the subject of this petition for review.  He argued that, based 
upon evidence that he would suffer serious harm upon 
removal, the BIA should reopen his immigration proceedings 
and reconsider its prior decision.  Specifically, Pllumi argued 
that he is entitled to humanitarian asylum because, regardless 
of whether he showed he had been or would be persecuted, he 
would suffer “other serious harm” if he were sent back to 
Albania because he would have to rely on Albania’s 
healthcare system, which he says is poorer than the United 
States’ system and insufficient to treat severe injuries he 
sustained in a hit-and-run car accident.  He contended that the 
harm he faced from substandard medical care warranted the 
BIA’s exercise of its authority to sua sponte reopen 
proceedings, even if his motion to reopen was deemed 
untimely.  Pllumi also argued that the BIA should reopen his 
proceedings based on changed country conditions in 
Albania.
3
   
 
On October 30, 2009, the BIA denied Pllumi’s motion 
to reopen and reconsider, holding that it was untimely.
4
  As to 
                                              
3
 To substantiate his fear of returning to Albania, he 
provided letters allegedly written by Albanian officials 
indicating that Socialist Party members and sympathizers 
continued to threaten and place psychological pressure on 
members of the Democratic Party.   
4
 As explained more fully herein, motions to 
reconsider and motions to reopen must be filed within 30 
6 
 
Pllumi’s argument of harm from substandard healthcare, the 
BIA said:  
 
Pllumi’s “concerns about his future healthcare on his 
return to Albania are not relevant to his persecution 
claim.  We separately note that the respondent may 
address a request for humanitarian parole for medical 
treatment to the DHS, as requests for deferred action 
are within the jurisdiction of DHS, not the Immigration 
Courts or this Board.” 
(AR at 4.)  The BIA concluded that Pllumi had “not presented 
an exceptional situation which would warrant reopening” and 
declined to exercise its authority to reopen his case sua 
sponte.   
 
 Pllumi has petitioned for review of the BIA’s decision 
that he failed to demonstrate changed country conditions such 
that he would be eligible for reopening under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  Alternatively, he contends that his petition 
should be granted because the BIA’s refusal to sua sponte 
reopen his proceedings is predicated on an error of law. 
 
                                                                                                     
days and 90 days respectively of the date of entry of a final 
administrative judgment.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B); 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).  The time limit for a motion to 
reopen, however, does not apply if the motion relates to an 
asylum application that is based upon changed country 
conditions and is supported by evidence that is material and 
was unavailable and could not have been discovered or 
presented at the earlier proceeding.  8 U.S.C.  § 
1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).   
7 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
In immigration cases, we review a denial of a motion 
to reopen or a motion to reconsider for abuse of discretion, 
regardless of the underlying basis of the alien’s request for 
relief.  INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323-24 (1992); 
Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 409 (3d Cir. 2003).  
We give the BIA’s decision broad deference and generally do 
not disturb it unless it is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to 
law.”  Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citation and quotation omitted).   
 
 However, motions that ask the BIA to sua 
sponte reopen a case
5
 are of a different character.  Because 
such motions are committed to the unfettered discretion of the 
BIA, we lack jurisdiction to review a decision on whether and 
how to exercise that discretion.
6
  Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 
320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003).  Nevertheless, in Mahmood 
v. Holder the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
                                              
5
 It seems a contradiction in terms to speak of motions 
seeking sua sponte action, since “sua sponte” means the 
doing of something “without prompting or suggestion,” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1560 (9th ed. 2009), but that is 
the terminology.  
 
6
 The Supreme Court in Kucana v. Holder specifically 
declined to express an “opinion on whether federal courts 
may review the Board’s decision not to reopen removal 
proceedings sua sponte.”  --- U.S. ---, 130 S. Ct. 827, 839 n. 
18 (2010).  Thus, Kucana does not disturb our precedent 
dictating that we generally lack jurisdiction to review the 
BIA’s decision not to reopen removal proceedings sua sponte.  
8 
 
Circuit suggested that there is jurisdiction to remand to the 
BIA for reconsideration when the BIA’s decision to decline to 
exercise its sua sponte authority is based on a misperception 
of the relevant law.  570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009).  In 
Mahmood, the petitioner, a native of Pakistan, filed for an 
adjustment of status after his marriage to a U.S. citizen.  Id. at 
467-68.  The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) 
found that the marriage had been entered into for “the 
purpose of evading the immigration laws” and, as a result, 
declined to adjust Mahmood’s status.  Id. at 468.  Mahmood 
was then granted a 120-day voluntary departure period with 
an alternative order of removal to Pakistan.  Id.  During that 
period, Mahmood divorced his first wife and, shortly 
thereafter, married another U.S. citizen and filed a motion to 
reopen his removal proceedings.  Id. He also sought to stay 
his voluntary departure, saying, “he would not have agreed to 
[it] had he understood the terms.”  Id.  The IJ held that 
Mahmood’s motion was untimely and that sua sponte 
reopening would be futile because Mahmood was barred from 
adjustment of status for a period of ten years because of his 
prior failure to depart.  Id.  Mahmood then filed an appeal, 
which the BIA dismissed for essentially the same reasons.  Id. 
at 469.     
 
Later, the Supreme Court in Dada v. Mukasey, 554 
U.S. 1 (2008), held that an alien could unilaterally withdraw 
from voluntary departure so as to pursue a motion to reopen.  
Mahmood, 570 F.3d at 470.  That meant that Mahmood’s 
stated desire to retract his decision to voluntarily depart 
would not have resulted in a ten-year bar to an adjustment of 
his status, as the BIA and IJ had thought when denying the 
motion to reopen.  In light of Dada, the Second Circuit 
determined that it was error for the IJ and BIA to assume that 
9 
 
Mahmood’s failure to timely depart from the United States 
“conclusively barred an adjustment of his status” and thus sua 
sponte reopening was not necessarily futile.  Id. at 467.  
Recognizing that it generally lacked jurisdiction to review the 
BIA’s decision to deny sua sponte reopening, the Second 
Circuit nevertheless remanded the case so that the BIA could 
reconsider it in light of Dada.  Id. at 467, 471.  The Court 
decided it could exercise jurisdiction “where the Agency may 
have declined to exercise its sua sponte authority because it 
misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly, 
that a reopening would necessarily fail.”  Id. at 469.   
 
We have not previously had occasion to consider 
whether a question of law arising in the context of a request 
for sua sponte reopening, as was implicated in Mahmood, 
gives rise to our jurisdiction.  As noted earlier, we typically 
cannot review a BIA decision to deny sua sponte reopening.  
That jurisdictional limitation is a product of precedent noting 
that there is simply no meaningful standard against which 
such a decision can be judged, because the BIA can make the 
decision for practically any reason at all;
7
 its discretion is 
                                              
7
 “No language in the [regulation enabling the BIA to 
reopen a proceeding sua sponte] requires the BIA to reopen a 
deportation proceeding under any set of particular 
circumstances.”  Calle-Vujiles, 320 F.3d at 475 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Anin v. Reno, 188 F.3d 1273, 1279 (11th Cir. 
1999)).  The BIA is generally allowed to reopen a case sua 
sponte in “exceptional situations” but no case has been found 
nor any pointed out by the parties that defines what is 
considered an “exceptional situation.”  But cf. Cruz v. Att’y 
Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 2006) (suggesting that a 





  Calle-Vujiles, 320 F.3d at 474-75; see 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).  
 
However, the discretionary character of a decision to 
reopen sua sponte does not mean that we are powerless to 
point out when a decision is based on a false legal premise.  
Mahmood demonstrates that, and we adopt the Second 
Circuit’s reasoning in that regard.  If the reasoning given for a 
decision not to reopen sua sponte reflects an error of law, we 
have the power and responsibility to point out the problem, 
even though ultimately it is up to the BIA to decide whether it 
will exercise its discretion to reopen.  We therefore conclude 
that, when presented with a BIA decision rejecting a motion 
for sua sponte reopening, we may exercise jurisdiction to the 
limited extent of recognizing when the BIA has relied on an 
incorrect legal premise.  In such cases we can remand to the 
BIA so it may exercise its authority against the correct “legal 
background.”  Mahmood, 570 F.3d at 469.  On remand, the 
BIA would then be free to deny or grant reopening sua 
sponte, and we would have no jurisdiction to review that 
decision.   
                                                                                                     
involving the invalidation of a criminal conviction used to 
support the alien’s removal charge has regularly been treated 
as an “exceptional situation” warranting sua sponte 
reopening, and stating that, “[w]here there is a consistent 
pattern of administrative decisions on a given issue, we would 
expect the BIA to conform to that pattern or explain its 
departure from it”). 
 
8
 We have no occasion now to consider whether there 
are constitutional boundaries that make such discretion less 




Here, it appears that the BIA may indeed have 
misperceived the relevant law.  We will therefore exercise 
jurisdiction to review the reasoning behind the BIA’s refusal 




A. Timeliness of Pllumi’s Motion 
 
Before considering the issue of sua sponte reopening, 
we address the timeliness of Pllumi’s motion to reconsider 
and to reopen his proceedings, and we briefly examine the 
sufficiency of the evidence he proffered on changed country 
conditions.  A motion to reconsider must be filed within 30 
days of the entry of the final administrative order of removal.  
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B).  Such a motion must claim “errors 
of law or fact” in the BIA’s prior decision and be supported 
by pertinent authority.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(C); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(b)(1).  The operative statute and regulation provide 
no exception to the time limitations on filing a motion to 
reconsider.   
 
Motions to reopen must be filed within 90 days of the 
entry of the final administrative order of removal.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i).  In contrast to the fixed time limit on a 
motion for reconsideration, however, the time limit for a 
motion to reopen does not apply if the motion relates to an 
asylum application and is based upon changed country 
                                              
9
 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2.  
We have jurisdiction pursuant to § 242 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252.   
12 
 
conditions proved by evidence that is material and was not 
available and could not have been discovered or presented at 
the previous proceeding.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).  The burden of proof on a motion to 
reopen is on the alien to establish eligibility for the requested 
relief.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c); see Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 
F.3d 372, 389 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that the BIA may deny a 
motion to reopen if it determines the alien has not established 
a prima facie case for the relief sought). 
 
The BIA issued a final administrative order in Pllumi’s 
case on June 28, 2007.  Pllumi’s combined motion to reopen 
and reconsider was not brought until September 17, 2009, 
well past the 30- and 90-day deadlines applicable to 
reopening and reconsideration respectively.  Thus, the BIA 
correctly decided that Pllumi’s motion was untimely, unless 
he proved with appropriate evidence that an adverse change 
in country conditions warranted reopening the case as to 
asylum.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).  
The BIA concluded that he did not, saying, “[the] evidence 
submitted does not demonstrate meaningfully changed 
conditions in Albania pertinent to [Pllumi’s] claim from the 
conditions in Albania when the case was before the 
Immigration Judge in 2005.”  (AR at 4.)   
 
The evidence Pllumi presented included letters from 
various individuals in Albania indicating that the area in 
which Pllumi’s hometown was located was “under 
psychological pressures … by left extremists” (AR at 107), 
and that his hometown itself was from time to time terrorized 
by Socialists due to lack of police services (AR at 105).  
Those letters, however, do not indicate “meaningfully 
changed country conditions” after 2005, when the case was 
13 
 
before the IJ.  (AR at 4.)  Rather, they suggest that the 
conditions described have persisted.  The other evidence 
proffered by Pllumi is no more convincing.
10
  The BIA did 
not abuse its discretion in deciding that Pllumi’s evidence of 
changed country conditions failed to support reopening his 
proceedings.  
 
B. The BIA’s Refusal to Sua Sponte Reopen 
 
Even though Pllumi’s motion to reopen and reconsider 
was untimely, the BIA retains the discretion to reopen his 
proceedings sua sponte.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a).  As earlier 
noted, the BIA said the following when it declined to reopen 
Pllumi’s case: 
 
Pllumi’s “concerns about his future healthcare 
on his return to Albania are not relevant to his 
persecution claim.  We separately note that the 
respondent may address a request for 
humanitarian parole for medical treatment to the 
DHS, as requests for deferred action are within 
the jurisdiction of DHS, not the Immigration 
Courts or this Board.” 
 
(App. at 4.)   This can be read as disclaiming any power to 
reopen immigration proceedings if the argument for 
                                              
10
 For example, Pllumi submitted information issued 
by the United States Department of State in 2005 and 2009 
respectively that indicates little has changed in Albania 
during that time period.  Further, it appears that the 
Democratic Party remains in power and that the country has 
made progress in improving its economic conditions.   
14 
 
reopening bears on the adequacy of healthcare in the country 
of removal.  If that is what the BIA meant, it has 
misapprehended the breadth of its own authority.   
 
Under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii) the BIA can grant 
relief to an applicant who has suffered past persecution but 
does not face a reasonable possibility of future persecution.  
Sheriff v. Att’y Gen., 587 F.3d 584, 595 (3d Cir. 2009).11  
That particular avenue of relief is typically called 
humanitarian asylum and it is available upon a showing of at 
least one of two types of circumstances: either that “[t]he 
applicant has demonstrated compelling reasons for being 
unwilling or unable to return to the country arising out of the 
severity of the past persecution[,]” 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A),
12
 or that the applicant “has 
established that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she 
may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that 
                                              
11
 The regulation at issue in Sheriff was actually 8 
C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B) but reads identically to 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B).  The latter is a duplication of the 
former as a result of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as 
amended, which transferred the functions of the INS to the 
Department of Homeland Security.  68 F.R. 9824-01.  Those 
two “provisions relate to both the INS and [the Executive 
Office for Immigration Review] and are so interrelated that 
no simple division of jurisdiction is possible” and thus 
duplication was required.  Id.   
 
12
 That category of asylum – one based on past 
persecution alone – is sometimes referred to as “Matter of 
Chen” asylum due to its treatment in the case In re Matter of 
Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16, 18 (BIA 1989).   
15 
 
country[,]”  8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B).  Only the latter 
type of humanitarian asylum, that based on “other serious 
harm,” is at issue here.   
 
We have determined that “other serious harm” means 
“harm that may not be inflicted on account of race, religion, 
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political group, but harm so serious as to equal the severity of 
persecution.”  Sheriff, 587 F.3d at 596 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  We have noted the Department of Justice’s 
position that economic disadvantage and the inability to 
practice one’s chosen profession are examples of harms that 
do not qualify as “other serious harm” in the context of 
humanitarian asylum.  Id.   
 
“While those two examples may not pass muster” as 
“other serious harm,” we have considered possible situations 
that would.  Id.  For example, we have cited a decision by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
concluding that debilitation and homelessness “appear[ed] to 
constitute serious harms for the purposes of” 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B).  Id. (quoting Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 
540 F.3d 555, 577 (7th Cir. 2008)).  In that case, the 
underlying facts were that the petitioner, if returned to Russia, 
would be without the only medications that controlled his 
mental illness and would thus be incapable of functioning on 
his own and unable to obtain housing and medical treatment.  
Kholyavskiy, 540 F.3d at 577.  Because it appeared that the 
petitioner’s situation might be one that would qualify as 
“serious harm,” the Seventh Circuit remanded to the BIA for 
further consideration on that issue because neither the IJ nor 
the BIA had explored the availability of the “other serious 
harm” variety of humanitarian asylum.  Id.   
16 
 
Just as debilitation and homelessness resulting from 
the unavailability of specific medications arguably fall within 
the ambit of “other serious harm,”  id., it is conceivable that, 
in extreme circumstances, harm resulting from the 
unavailability of necessary medical care could constitute 
“other serious harm” under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B).  
We hasten to add and to emphasize that we are not suggesting 
that differing standards of healthcare around the world are, in 
themselves, a basis for asylum.  We are only holding that the 
issue of health care is not off the table in the asylum context, 
as the BIA seemed to say when it remarked that “[Pllumi’s] 
concerns about his future healthcare on his return to Albania 
are not relevant.”  (App. at 4)  On the contrary, it is within the 
BIA’s authority to consider health concerns and associated 
“harms” resulting from deportation when it exercises its 
discretion in deciding whether to grant humanitarian asylum.  
To the extent, then, that the BIA considered Pllumi’s health 
issues irrelevant to its decision on sua sponte reopening 
because it thought those issues could not be considered, it 
erred.
13
   
                                              
13
 Our conclusion here does not affect in any way our 
rejection of the proposition that a lack of healthcare in a 
petitioner’s home country can serve as a basis for relief under 
the CAT.  As we explained in Pierre v. Attorney General, 528 
F.3d 180 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc), that is because, under the 
governing regulations, an act only constitutes torture if it is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such 
purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third 
person information or a confession, punishing 
him or her for an act he or she or a third person 
has committed or is suspected of having 
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or 
17 
 
Given the possibility that the BIA mistakenly thought 
it did not have the authority to consider Pllumi’s health 
concerns as “other serious harm” under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B), we will follow Mahmood and remand 
to the BIA for clarification of the basis for its decision 
declining to exercise its discretion to reopen Pllumi’s case.  If 
the BIA “misperceived the legal background” for its exercise 
of discretion, Mahmood, 570 F.3d at 469, it should now take 
its full authority into account.  We note that, though it is 
within the BIA’s jurisdiction to consider Pllumi’s health 
concerns, the BIA is not required to find that those concerns 
qualify as “other serious harm” under 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(B), and nothing we have said here should 
be taken as implying otherwise.  If on remand the BIA 
declines to exercise its sua sponte authority but does so in a 
manner that does not indicate a misunderstanding of its 
authority, then that decision will be unreviewable.    
                                                                                                     
her or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or 
suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of 
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official 
capacity. 
(quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1)).  In short, the CAT 
“requires a showing of specific intent before the court can 
make a finding that a petitioner will be tortured.” Id.  The 
pain and hardship that an alien subject to removal may suffer 
because of inadequate healthcare in the country of removal 
are “unintended consequence[s] [that are] not the type of 





For the forgoing reasons we will grant Pllumi’s 
petition for review, vacate the BIA’s order, and remand to the 
BIA for further consideration consistent with this opinion.  
